A. Introduction
The current financial crisis was caused by a real estate boom and bust, with an accompanying cycle of bank credit expansion. Some states both in Europe and in the United States were particularly severely affected by this cycle. Yet there was never any question that the US states thus affected would have to have special bail-out support, or be considered at risk of leaving the dollar area, whereas such concerns became rife in the euro-currency zone.
So in this study we explore the adjustment mechanisms in three states, one in the USA and two in Europe, which were particularly badly hit by the recent cycle. Our chosen American state was Arizona. In Europe we examined two countries. The first is Spain, which is currently having problems in achieving a satisfactory adjustment. The second is Latvia, which does seem to have (partially) adjusted via internal devaluation, but at some considerable cost. Initially, when the financial shock first hit, 2007 Q2 until 2008 Q4, the extent of increasing divergence between states in the USA and in Europe, (both EU and Eurozone), was roughly similar, as measured by the standard deviation of unemployment, both with states equally weighted and weighted by population. But from 2009 onwards the SD in Europe continued to widen continuously, whereas it fell after a time in the USA, as documented in Table 1 , in Appendix 2, and Chart 1. We also show in Chart 2 and 3 the best and worst two states, as well as the average. Moreover, the initial housing market shock measured by the housing price index (HPI), and the response to that, were not all that different in the USA and in Europe, (EU and Eurozone). Again we measure this by the standard deviation of states, (equally weighted), around the average, Table A, Appendix 2. We show this graphically, for the worst and best states, in Charts 5 and 6. What then appears is that, after a common initial shock, the states in the USA converged, but increasingly diverged in Europe. As a result of history the USA has become much more united, more of an optimal currency area than divergent Europe. So there is far more need to improve adjustment mechanisms, in response to idiosyncratic shocks, in the EU. We turn now to a study of how such mechanisms appear to have worked in our three chosen states.
We review how four different adjustment mechanisms may have worked in each of our three states.
The first two relate to labour markets. If wage rates were perfectly flexible in response to idiosyncratic shocks, then it would not be a problem for any country/region to abide in a larger single currency region. So we look first at the relationship between unemployment in each state, (relative to the average for the currency region as a whole), compared with real unit labour costs in that state, relative to the currency region as a whole (n.b. Latvia is not yet a formal member of the euro-currency area, but maintained a fixed peg to the euro throughout: Despite some suggestions, at one stage, supposedly from the IMF, that Latvia should devalue, its foremost policy was to maintain its peg to the euro).
B. Labour Markets: Wage Adjustment
So we start by examining how flexible labour markets have been in our three states. In the charts below we show the relationship between the real unit labour costs (RULC) and unemployment (UE) in three different formats.
(1) We use the absolute level of both RULC and UE in all three states.
Then, we attempt to eliminate the trends in each state in two ways. (2) We represent both RULC and UE in terms of a ratio with the US average, for Arizona, and the Eurozone average for Spain and Latvia. However, in Latvia the RULC has had a much steeper upward trend than in the Eurozone as a whole, which results in an evident trend in the ratio itself. We removed this trend in the Latvian RULC by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with data up to 2Q08. (3) We also plot the relationship between the percentage change in real unit labour costs and the relative unemployment for each of our three countries. Note that, in all three cases, diamonds represent periods up until 3Q08 and Xs the subsequent quarters through 3Q11, while x-axis is RULC and y-axis is UE.
(1) RULC and UE in absolute terms 
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When trends are eliminated, Latvia shows a notable negative correlation between RULC and UE, implying relatively flexible wages. In both Arizona and Spain, in all three examples, it is hard to observe any relationship between RULC and UE.
Next, we analyse the same data using regressions. We show the relationship for each country between the percentage change in RULC and the change in the relative unemployment, with the latter lagged four quarters; the lag length chosen by the highest adjusted R-squared. This also makes sense from a practical point of view as wage negotiations typically take place once a year. Finally we provide a multiple regression for each country,
The results of the regression repeat the analysis from charts. The actual equation results are set out in full in Appendix 1. The only country within our sample that displays any significant wage adjustment is Latvia, while the correlations between RULC and UE are insignificant in both Arizona and Spain.
In Arizona, the individual coefficients are not significant, and the adjusted R-squared is minimal. In line with the charts, there does not seem to be much, if any, correlation between RULC and relative unemployment. In Spain, however, the whole regression and both coefficients are significant at a 5% significance level, although the fit of the regression is poor, with an adjusted R-squared of only 0.16. Here, the role of current relative unemployment is plausible, with b1 recording -0.21, (but b2 has the wrong sign and a larger coefficient).
If we omit the change in relative unemployment and run the regression again, the explanatory power of the equation decreases significantly, with adjusted R-squared falling to 0.004, while the relative unemployment also turning insignificant with a p-value of 0.28.
As expected from the scatter plot, Latvia RULC and UE show a significant negative correlation, with b1 and b2 at -2.28 and -1.16, respectively. Unlike the other two countries, where the change in relative unemployment had an insignificant impact, current relative unemployment has a larger impact in Latvia. With the data being quarterly, this might reflect that a somewhat quicker and flexible wage adjustment process in Latvia (than elsewhere). Meanwhile, the regression has a relatively good fit, with an adjusted R-squared at 0.41.
For all three of our sample states, we estimated what might happen, according to these equations, if we assumed a 10% increase in the relative unemployment rate taking place at a steady pace in the next two years (i.e. 1¼% more per quarter). The country that is estimated to show the largest deviation from trends previous would be Latvia, with our model expecting only 1.5% annual growth in RULC relative to EU, significantly lower than 5.2% rise averaged from 2003 to 2007, i.e. an improvement of 3.7% per annum. In contrast, Arizona's relative real wages to the USA are estimated to edge down by 0.3% per year, only a marginal shift in pace from averaging no change before the crisis, while Spain would be down about 0.5% annually, compared to an average relative increase of 0.4% during the 5 years through 2007.
C. Labour Markets: Migration
Ever since Blanchard and Katz (1992) appeared, however, it has been known that the apparent greater adjustment facility in the USA did not arise from greater wage flexibility. As we have shown above, that remains. Our US state has slightly less wage flexibility than Spain, and much less than Latvia. Instead it seemed to derive from a greater mobility of workers and their families. Thus when work dried up in, say, Massachusetts or Arizona, workers (and their families) moved to where work could more easily be found. This was contrasted with greater inertia in Europe, where it was argued, see Decressin and Fatás (1995) , that a lesser availability of work in badly affected states/regions simply led, after a temporary period of high unemployment, to lower participation rates.
Did this comparison, of flexible migration in the USA, specifically in Arizona, and low migration in Europe, specifically in Latvia and Spain, still hold true?
First, however, one should note that the basic data in all three cases are suspect. Both Arizona and Spain had large inward migration through most recent years, see the data in the data Appendix, Appendix 2. But there will also have been some sizeable unrecorded illegal migration in both cases, in Arizona from Mexico and in Spain mostly from Africa. But so long as the ratio of recorded to unrecorded migration remains constant, the maintained assumption here, estimates of relative speeds of adjustment remain usable.
Eye-balling the raw data, the extent of change in migration in recent years in Spain and in Arizona looks roughly similar. In both cases after the crisis struck net inwards migration fell from about 1½% of population to about ½% per annum. However the regression results tell a slightly different story.
Migration in Spain has been primarily due to the macro-economic factor driving such flows, more so than in Arizona; in the equation Mig t = a + b 1 Relative UE t , the adjusted R 2 is 0.96 in Spain and 0.47 in Arizona. But the coefficient on relative unemployment, at -1.4 in Spain is notably less than that in Arizona, at -6.9. Recently, the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia has released its own set of estimates on net migration in the ten years up to 2011. Although the numbers now are consistent with the census results, the migration patterns seems to have been smoothed out, especially when comparing the Latvian data with reported inflows from Latvia in the four OECD countries that apparently received the largest migration flows from Latvia, with early-2000 numbers now having been marked up significantly from previous estimates. However, the OECD data does not provide a full set of countries. So, we attempt to estimate the intervening ten years' worth of data using the temporal patterns from the countries reporting to the OECD and the aggregate change in net migration from the Latvian census.
Using the actual recorded (tiny) figures for net emigration from Latvia, this also appears to have been primarily driven by relative UE, the adjusted R 2 being 0.57, but the resulting coefficient, at -0.2, was much smaller than in the case of Spain and Arizona. If we gross up, to fit the census data, and assuming that unrecorded emigration has an identical annual pattern as in the OECD data to that We may assume, perhaps, that the discrepancy between the actual, and implied Census, figures for net migration out of Latvia relates to unrecorded emigration. But some, possibly large, part of that implied net emigration over these ten years may have been due mainly to socio-political factors, i.e.
to the changing and lowered status of the Russian (ethnic and speaking) segment of the population, rather than to primarily macro-economic factors. So if we gross up the annual recorded net migration figures to match the implicit decennial data from the census, we may be getting an exaggerated upper bound to estimates of Latvian migration in response to relative unemployment.
In addition, if we take these considerations into account by changing the model to Migt = a + b1 UEt + b2Migt-1, to include some trend auto-correlation, partly due to other factors, then we get a much better fit for the OECD-trend interpolated data. The adjusted R-squared increase from 0.34 to 0.81, while the coefficient for relative unemployment moves down from -1.45 to -0.89.
With such a small sample of states, and with such severe data problems, especially in the Latvian case, it is difficult to come to any conclusions. Whereas the coefficient of the effect of UE in migration was larger in Arizona, than in Spain or than (in most regressions) for Latvia, relative UE explained more of such migration as occurred in the two European states. Perhaps all that can be said is that in some European states migration has become quite flexible in response to macroeconomic factors, so that the prior difference in this respect between the US and the Eurozone is no longer quite so marked. internal labour (within US) mobility is generally regarded as 'good', bringing flexibility and adjustment. Whereas in Europe such labour mobility is more often seen as a severe cost to those involved. Thus the massive, (census implied), Latvian emigration is perceived as a huge cost for a policy of internal devaluation, Leitner (2008) . Of course, it is possible that migration within Europe is far more costly to those migrating than in the USA, with the latter having a common language, a common culture and a common system. Even so we know of little empirical work on the relative costs and benefits of internal migration in the USA, as compared with Europe.
Nevertheless our provisional conclusion is that differential mobility in response to relative UE is not the over-riding factor allowing more flexible adjustment in the United States than in Europe, though this may result from our choice of the three specific states studied here. So if the differential factor is not mobility, what is it?
D. Fiscal Differences
There is a developing consensus, to which one of us has contributed, e.g. Goodhart (1998) , that a common monetary union needs some supporting fiscal unification to survive. One aspect of this idea is that an idiosyncratic adverse shock would be, quasi-automatically, buffered by countercyclical fiscal transfers, (higher unemployment benefits and lower tax payments). So we looked in each case to see how far such fiscal transfers did act as a counter-cyclical buffer.
We started with Arizona. The data on net fiscal transfers are set out in Appendix 2. We regressed such net transfers, as a percentage of state GDP, against relative unemployment in Arizona, i.e. ratio -5.000 -4.000 -3.000 -2.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 What the Arizona results suggest is that the normal quasi-automatic fiscal buffering implied by the US federal fiscal system may be quite small by now, but that would need further testing on a complete study of all US states. But what both the Arizona and Latvian results indicate is that in a big crisis, when the political will to do so is there, enough fiscal resources can be mobilised to make a significant difference. A problem in Spain has been that the political will to help, from the other major European countries, has not (yet?) been in evidence. One of the factors causing the crisis to deepen in Europe has been in the interaction between the weakening of the State and of its national banks, with causation going in both directions; thus in Greece the sovereign dragged down the banks, whereas in Iceland, Ireland and (to a lesser degree) Spain, the reverse happened. This interaction between individual states and the banks therein was also vastly less in the USA, partly because individual state debt plays such a much more minor role in overall US public sector debt, and because the main US banks are now all cross-border federal entities, like Citi, Bank of America, etc.
Again there is a similar interaction between the local state economy and local banks. When local bank loans are focussed on local lending (especially to real estate), a collapse of the local real estate market will severely damage the health of the local banking system. 1 This will make such banks unwilling and unable to extend new loans in the adversely hit state, thereby further amplifying the cycle.
In Arizona there are a large number of (tiny) local state banks, but the bulk of loans and deposits
were at large nation-wide US banks, see Appendix 2. So, when the Arizona economy deteriorated, the nation-wide banks could continue to apply their nation-wide lending criteria. By contrast, in
Spain almost all banking is done by locally headquartered banks, though some of the large banks, e.g. BBVA and Santander were protected in part by their international diversification, e.g. in Latin America. We were not able to find data on foreign bank participation in loans/deposits in Spain but we are confident that this is small.
Latvia is, in this respect, half-way between Arizona and Spain. In 2011, the year for which we have data, 56% of the deposits in Latvia were with locally head-quartered banks. Almost all the rest were with Swedish banks, particularly Swedbank 14% and SEB Bank 9%. In that same year, which was, of course, a crisis year, no less than 73% of loans were made by the foreign (mostly Swedish) banks and only 27% by the Latvian banks. This underlines the point that, when an asymmetric shock hits a region within a wider currency area and without a Central Bank of its own, that region will lose out badly if its own banks are primarily local.
The implication of this is that a 'banking union' may be as important to the continuing success of the euro, as a fiscal union could be, though the two are linked by the need to pre-arrange euro-zone measures for bank resolution.
There is, however, a caveat. The nation-wide nature of the US banking system is quite recent.
Before the liberalisation of recent decades, local political patriotism and concern with the 'moneypower' of New York (from Andrew Jackson onwards) had made banking in the USA even more localised there than in Europe, e.g. via the McFadden Act (1927). This has two implications. The first is that the heterogeneity of state economic outcomes should have been decreasing over time in the USA in line with the greater nation-wide unification of banking, a testable hypothesis in principle.
The second is that a 'banking union' while desirable for a currency union is not essential. What matters most of all is public political support.
F. Conclusion
This is a preliminary and partial exercise which could with benefit be extended to encompass all US and EU States. Nevertheless it did bring some suggestive results which we had not previously anticipated. What was expected was that neither in Arizona nor in Spain was there any sign of wage flexibility allowing beneficial shifts in relative unit labour costs in response to relative UE. Latvia, however, did show some flexibility in this respect.
Although the underlying data left quite a lot to be desired, our partial results suggested that the conventional wisdom that the US adjusted to asymmetric shocks via labour mobility, whereas
Europe did not, may need reconsideration. Our results indicate that labour mobility was almost as great in Spain as in Arizona, and probably considerably greater (than in Arizona) in Latvia. What does, however, impress us is the difference in attitude to such mobility within the USA [but not between the USA and other countries] where within US mobility is broadly seen as bringing greater flexibility and a sign of a vibrant, entrepreneurial economy, and within Europe where it is seen as a cost (to both emitting and recipient countries) with damaging social implications.
We also found less evidence of quasi-automatic counter-cyclical fiscal flows from the federal centre in Arizona than we had expected. But when the crisis really hit, both Arizona and Latvia were supported. Perhaps the more important requirement is the political will to give fiscal help to a neighbouring state in difficulties rather than quasi-automatic fiscal institutions.
Finally, and perhaps most important, both our work and general evidence from this latest crisis suggests that having the local banking system focussed primarily on the local state debt and the local state economy is likely to exaggerate and to amplify idiosyncratic shocks, especially when the state is part of a wider monetary union without its own Central Bank, exchange rate and monetary policy.
Perhaps the euro-currency region needs a banking union even more urgently than it needs a fiscal union. 
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